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STATEMENT OF ISSUES
The plaintiff seeks to have the Supreme Court modify the
alimony award entered by Judge Hanson in the Third Judicial
District Court,

The plaintiff believes that the amount and

duration of the alimony award is excessive based upon the health
condition of the appellant and the income and resources available
to the parties.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a final order of Judge Timothy R.
Hanson in a divorce action heard in the Third Judicial District
Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah,
held in this matter on October 11, 1984.

A trial was

A Memorandum

Decision

was issued by Judge Hanson on the 22nd day of October, 1984, and
an Order to Show Cause was heard by Judge Hanson on the 4th of
April, 1985, to clarify his Memorandum Decision.

Findings of

Fact, Conclusions of Law, and a Divorce Decree were entered in
this matter on the 16th day of May, 1985.

The appeal date in

this case was extended until June 13, 1985, by an Order of Judge
Hanson pursuant to Rule 4e of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure. This appeal was filed on June 12, 1985.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The parties were married on November 20, 1959, and there
were two children of the marriage:

Jennifer and James.

At the

time of the divorce hearing, the 11th of October, 1984, Jennifer
was 18 years of age but had not completed high school; and James

1

was 14 years of age.

The parties had been separated since March

of 1982. (Reporter's Transcript

[RT.] Volume [V.] II, page [p]

87)
At the time of the divorce decree, the respondent, Doroth;
Ann Armstrong, was 49 years of age and had no significant
problems. (RT.- V. II, p. 86)

health

The respondent has a Bachelor of

Science Degree from the University of Utah in education and
taught school for five to six years.
in 1970.

Her last teaching job was

However, she has renewed her teaching certificate sine*

that time.

(RT. V. II, p. 88)

The respondent made no serious

effort to obtain a job between March 1982 and January 1984.
Between January of 1984 and October of 1984 she applied at two
school districts, but did not attempt to find any other type of
employment.

(RT. V. II, p. 90)

At the divorce hearing the

respondent was asked, "Question, The truth of the matter is, you
don't intend to do anything to contribute to your own support if
you don't have to?
90-91)

Answer:

That is the truth."

(RT. V. II p.

Judge Hanson, on page 15 of his Memorandum Decision,

found that "...the evidence the Court received from the defendant
during the course of the trial, suggests the defendant's efforts
at employment

indicate that her attempts and intentions are less

than satisfactory.

The defendant, if she intends to live in the

manner that she has been accustomed, even during the period of
separation between the parties will have to actively seek and
obtain employment

in the field in which she is qualified."

(Record p. 256) Prior to the divorce hearing in October of 1984,
the plaintiff was

required, on a temporary basis, to pay to the

plaintiff the sum of $1,600.00 per month.

(RT. V. I, p, 134)

At the time of the divorce the appellant was 51 years of
age.

When the parties separated in approximately March of 1982,

the appellant was employed as the Executive Vice President of
Farm Bureau Insurance Company.

(RT. V. I, p. 132)

The appellant

lost that job and prior to the divorce hearing began to receive
disability payments from CNA Insurance Company.

That insurance

company had made a determination that the appellant was
permanently and totally disabled.

Based upon that determination,

the appellant had been receiving $2,000.00 per month since
January 1, 1984, although he only received $1,363.00 for the
month of September, 1984.

The appellant does not receive any

Social Security payments.

(RT. V. I, p. 87-89)

The appellant,

at the time of the divorce hearing, received rent on duplexes
owned by the parties in the amount of $450.00 per month; income
from a trust held in the name of the children in the sum of
$524.00 per month; and income from rental unit number 7 in Valley
Terraces in the sum of $575.00 per month.

(RT. V. I, p. 67, 72)

Judge Hanson ordered that the duplex be sold immediately and that
the equity be divided among the parties.

(Record p. 250 and 325)

The funds held in the trust account for the children consisted of
the income received from the sale of Unit No. 4 of Valley
Terraces.

That money was placed in a trust for the children in

1982 because of the appellant's ill health and his desire to
insure that the children had funds for their education and to go
on a mission if they desired.

(RT. V. I, p. 71-72)

Unit No. 7

of Valley Terraces, on which the appellant was receiving $575.00
per month as of October of 1984, was valued at approximately
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$78,000.00 and had existing indebtedness against it in the
approximate sum of $82,000.00,

Payments on that unit were over

year delinquent and $10,000.00 in arrears.

The appellant

expected Unit No. J to be taken over by Utah Bank and Trust in
the immediate future.

(RT, V. I, p. 73-74)

The appellant owned

an interest in six other units located in Valley Terraces,

Thos<

units were sold for $214,304,00 at a sheriff's sale by Citizen's
Bank and Trust on July 29, 1984,

The outstanding

against the six units were $607,889.00,

obligations

The appellant is

personally liable for the remaining balance of approximately
$393,000.00.

(RT. V. I, p. 73-76)

The defendant's monthly

expenses amounted to $1,557.00 which did not include the debts hi
was required to pay on a monthly
appellant's Exhibit P-5.

basis as set forth in the

(RT. V, I, p. 127, Exhibits P-5 and

P-6)
The appellant has a serious health and blood problem and
was treated for that problem by Dr. J. F. Orme, Sr.

The doctor

testified in detail concerning the appellant's health
(RT. V. I, p. 5-23)

problem.

The doctor testified that the appellant's

health condition was permanent and that without surgery his
condition would become worse.

(RT. V. I, p. 23 and 15)

Without

surgery the appellant's condition could worsen to the point that
he would go into congestive heart failure and die.
16)

(RT. V. I, p.

The doctor testified that the risk of surgery was great.

He stated that he has operated on three patients with conditions
similar to that of the appellant and two of the three have died.
(RT. V.

p. 17-18)

The appellant is receiving medications for
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the purposes of forestalling a stroke and to control his heart
condition.

Those medications are Coumadin, digoxin, propranolol,

and verapinil.

(RT. V. I, p. 18-19)

The appellant suffers side

effects from the medication, including nausea, vomiting, reduced
appetite, diarrhea, irregular heart beat, depression, central
nervous system problems, and fatigue, (RT. V. I, p. 19-20)
Because of the heart condition, the appellant suffers from
fatigue, inability to concentrate, a loss of sleep, and an
increase of worry.

(RT. V. I, p. 20)

The doctor testified that

the appellant f s health condition would affect his ability to hold
a job and there would be limits upon his physical exertion, his
mental concentration, and his ability to withstand
strain.

(RT. V. I, p. 22-23)

emotional

A medical report was written by

the doctor concerning the appellant f s health

and is marked as

Exhibit P-8.
In June of 1983, the appellant was in the hospital for
approximately one and a half weeks for a cardiac conversion.
July 15, 1983, he was again admitted

On

to the hospital for the same

type of problem and was treated with electrical shock and given
quinidine.

Since July of 1983, he has received

emergency

treatment on two occasions when his heart beat exceeded
per minute.

He is in a constant state of cardiac

(RT. V. I, p. 129-131)

The appellant

testified

160 beats

arrhythmia.

that because of

his health condition he suffers pain, lack of ability
to sleep at night, tiredness, and lack of emotional
(RT. V. I, p. 131-132)
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stability.

The Court found that the parties owned a home acquired
during their marriage.
$96,400.00.

Said home had an equity in the amount of

The Court awarded the home to the respondent with a

lien in favor of the appellant in the sum of $48,200.00 to be
paid when the respondent sells the home, remarries, or when the
youngest child reaches 18.

(Record p. 246)

The Court ordered

that the duplex from which the appellant had been receiving
$450.00 per month, be sold immediately and that the equity
therein be divided

so that both parties

approximately $3^,000.00.

would

receive

(Record p. 250 and 325)

The Court

awarded the appellant the interest in Valley Terraces, including
any funds not committed to a trust, and required the appellant tc
assume $400,000.00 worth of indebtedness owed thereon.

The Court

said that if the funds from Unit No. 4 of Valley Terraces were ir
a legitimate trust, then the trust should continue to be held for
the children and distributed
trust.

in accordance with the terms of the

(Record p. 248 - 253)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The appellant contends that Judge Hanson abused his

discretion in awarding the respondent permanent alimony in the
amount of $1,000.00 per month.

The respondent possesses more of

the family assets and has a greater earning capacity than does
the appellant by reason of the appellant f s physical health.
Consequently, the appellant should not be required to pay
alimony, or said alimony should be phased out so that it
terminates by the time the youngest child reaches majority.

6

ARGUMENT
THE ALIMONY AWARD MADE BY THE LOWER COURT IS EXCESSIVE
AND UNREASONABLE IN LIGHT OF THE INCOME AND RESOURCES
AVAILABLE TO THE APPELLANT,
This Court in the case of DeMar Jones vs. Harriet H.
Jones, File No. 18733 (filed on April 17, 1985) set forth the
guideline that should be applied by a Court in determining the
amount and duration of alimony.

While the facts of that case are

not similar to the facts in this case, the standard annunciated
by the Court should apply in all divorce actions.

The Court

citing English vs. English, 565 P. 2nd at 411, stated that the
three factors that should be considered in affixing alimony were:
(1)

The financial conditions and need of the wife, (2)

The

ability of the wife to produce a sufficient income for herself,
and (3) The ability of the husband to provide support.

The Court

also made reference to the assets available to the parties and
the life style of the couple

prior to the divorce.

It is the

position of the appellant that the application of these standard
to the case presently pending before this Court will demonstrate
that the District Court Judge abused his discretion in fixing
permanent alimony in the sum of $1,000.00 per month.
The evidence presented to the Court clearly established
that the appellant has a permanent, deteriorating health
condition and that his ability to work is severely limited
because of the effects of that health condition and the side
effects of the medication he is required to take.

Those

limitations include nausea, loss of appetite, loss of sleep,
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depression, loss of energy and interest, lack of ability to
concentrate, and physical fatigue.

The appellant's health

condition can only be corrected with high risk surgery.
I,

p. 5-23, 129-132)

(RT. V.

In contrast, the respondent is

approximately two years younger than the appellant and is in gooc
health.

(RT. V. II, p. 86)

The respondent has a Bachelor of

Science Degree from the University of Utah and holds a current
teaching certificate.

(RT. V. II, p. 88)

The respondent

testified in Court that she had not made serious efforts to
obtain employment

since she separated

from the appellant in 1982,

and that she did not intend to obtain employment and contribute
to the support of herself and her children unless she had to.
(RT. V. II, p. 87, 90-91)

Judge Hanson concluded that the

respondent had not made reasonable efforts to contribute to her
own support.

(Record p. 252)

The income available to the appellant at the time of the
divorce decree consisted of $2,000.00 disability payments,
$575.00 from the rental of Unit No. 7 of Valley Terraces, $450.00
from the rents received from the duplex belonging to the parties,
and $525.00 per month from the children's trust.
67, 72, 87-89)

(RT. V. I, p.

The $575.00 income from Unit No. 7 of Valley

Terraces was expected to terminate in the immediate future.

The

appellant owed $4,000.00 more on the unit than it was worth, had
not made a payment on the unit in over a year, and was delinquent
in payments
70-71*)

in the approximate sum of $10,000.00.

(RT. V. I, p.

The Court ordered that the duplex belonging to the

parties be sold immediately.

(Record p. 325 - 326)

8

The sale,

of course, would terminate that source of income to the
appellant.

At the time of the divorce hearing, the appellant

was receiving $3,550.00 per month from all sources.

The Court

knew that the appellant was going to lose the $575.00 per month
from Unit No. 7 and that he would lose the income from the duplex
as soon as it was sold, thereby reducing his income in the
immediate future to $2,525.00.

The appellant was required to pay

$1,600.00 per month as alimony and child support, leaving him a
balance of $925.00.

The appellant's expenses exceeded

per month, plus the debts listed as Exhibit P-5.
127 and Exhibits P-5 and

$1,500.00

(RT. V. I, p.

P-6)

The respondent is an educated, licensed teacher, who has
the ability to obtain current employment and contribute to her
own support.

The appellant has

a permanent health condition

which will deteriorate and which limits his energies and
abilities to contribute to his own support.

The appellant has no

assets available to him other than the moneys he is to receive
from the duplex when it is sold, and his disability income.

The

respondent has available to her the use of the parties' home, her
half of the equity to be obtained from the sale of the duplex,
and her ability to earn an income as a teacher.

The evidence

demonstrates that the respondent has more income potential and
more assets than does the appellant.

Under the circumstances, it

is the position of the appellant that he should not be required
to pay any alimony, or in the alternative the alimony be reduced
each year so that it terminates by the time the youngest child
reaches majority.

Without such a reduction or termination, the

respondent will not attempt to contribute to her own support.

CONCLUSIONS
The appellant contends that Judge Hanson abused his
discretion in awarding the respondent permanent alimony in the
amount of $1,000,00 per month.

It is the position of the

appellant that his health condition limits his ability to produce
an income and that the respondent possesses a greater ability to
produce an income from employment because of her education and
health than does the appellant.

The appellant also maintains

that the respondent is in possession of greater assets than the
appellant in that she has been awarded the use of the home and
one-half of the equity accumulated by the parties during the
marriage and has not been required to assume any of the major
indebtedness incurred by the parties during the marriage.
the appellant has been required

to pay approximately

That

$400,000,00

worth of indebtedness and will not have access to his share of
the equity

in the parties home until such time as the respondent

remarries or the youngest child reaches 18 years of age.

Given

the facts presented before the Court, the appellant contends that
the plaintiff should not be awarded any alimony, and in the event
the Court determines she should be awarded alimony, said alimony
should be phased out so that it terminates by the time the
youngest child reaches majority.
DATED this

day of October, 1985.

ROBERT A, ECHARD
Attorney for Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
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E. H. Fankhauser, Attorney for Respondent, 660 South 200 East,
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H. Dixon HintfWy. ClerJ^3rd Oist Gourt-

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

DELBERT C. ARMSTRONG,
ORDER
Plaintiff,
vs.
DOROTHY ANN ARMSTRONG,
Civil No. D 8 2-3694
Defendant.
Based upon the Motion of the plaintiff and the Stipulation
of the parties, in good cause appearing, now therefore,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the period in which the parties
are allowed to app'eal from the aDove captioned matter is extended
for a period of 30 days in conformance with Rule 4E of the Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure which extension would require that
the parties file an appeal prior to J u n / l 4 , 1985 in the above
captioned matter.
DATED this M

day of May, /9i

ATTEST
H. DIXON HtNDlfy

* $»^4J»y8gg%
3oi

Salt Lake County, Utat

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

DELBERT C. ARMSTRONG,

:

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Plaintiff,

:

CIVIL NO. D-82-3694

vs.

:

DOROTHY ANN ARMSTRONG,
Defendant.

:
:

The above-referenced matter came on for trial October 11,
1984.

Both parties were present and represented by counsel.

The Court took evidence and the matter continued through October
12, 1984.

Counsel for the respective parties made their closing

arguments, urging upon the Court their respective proposed divisions
of property, alimony, support and other issues presented during
the course of the trial. The Court took the matter under advisement
to consider the evidence, review and consider the exhibits received
during the course of the trial.

The Court has now reviewed

the testimony, reviewed the exhibits received during the course
of the trial and the pleadings on file in this matter, and being
otherwise fully advised, enters the following Memorandum Decision.
There are a number of issues that need to be addressed
separately by the Court, the issues remaining for decision are
identified as follows:
1.

The Divorce.

TRONG V. ARMSTRONG

PAGE THREE

plaintiff cruelly, causing

MEMORANDUM DECISION

him great mental distress and

rering.
The Court
established

finds

that

sufficient

the

defendant

grounds

for

on her

granting

Counterclaim
a divorce

in

favor and a g a i n s t the p l a i n t i f f . o n the b a s i s of mental c r u e l t y
that the p l a i n t i f f
> defendant

has through h i s words and a c t i o n s

cruelly,

causing

her

great

treated

mental d i s t r e s s

and

rfering.
The Court finds that it has jurisdiction over the parties
this matter in that the requirements of residency have been
tablished.
The Court determines

that because this matter has been

file for in excess of two years, that there is no chance
reconciliation between the parties, the relationship having
steriorated substantially, that good cause exists for waiving
ne interlocutory period and the divorce should become final
pon this Court signing and entering the Findings of Fact, Conlusions of Law, and the Decree.
.

CUSTODY OF THE MINOR CHILD AND VISITATION
There are two children as issue as a result of this marriage,

'he oldest child has recently reached age 18, but still has
:he last year of high school to complete.

The evidence

shows

:hat the oldest child of the parties will complete high school
Dn or about June 1, 1985.

The parties have a second child who

ARMSTRONG V. ARMSTRONG

PAGE TWO

MEMORANDUM DECISION

2.

Custody of the minor child.

3.

Visitation of the minor child.

4.

Division of the residence.

5.

Division of the duplex.

6.

Division of the interests in the Valley Terraces

Condominium complex in Ogden, Utah.
7.

Division of the Idaho accounts.

8.

Division of the retirement through the plaintiff's

employment.
9.

The amount of child support for the minor child.

10. The amount of alimony.
11. Division of household

furniture and furnishings,

including personal property of the parties.
12. Division of the vehicles.
13. Distribution of the life insurance policies and
designation of beneficiaries.
14. The advisability of a mutual Restraining Order.
15. Awarding of attorney's fees as may be appropriate.
1.

DIVORCE - RESIDENCY, GROUNDS, INTERLOCUTORY PERIOD
The Court finds that the plaintiff on his Complaint

established

sufficient grounds

has

for granting a divorce in his

favor and against the defendant on the basis of mental cruelty
in that the defendant has through her words and actions treated

P^

RONG V. ARMSTRONG

MEMORANDUM DECISION

PAGE FOUR

:ill in his minority.

The parties have agreed and stipulated

custody of the minor child shall be with the defendant.
Visitation

is in dispute.

Based upon all the evidence,

Court determines that absent an agreement between the parties
t period of visitation is appropriate.

The Court determines

a visitation schedule with the oldest child who has now
shed her majority would be inappropriate, and the plaintiff
the oldest child of the parties will make their own respective
isions regarding

the contact between the two of them.

The

rt finds that visitation with the minor son should be every
ter weekend, commencing Friday evening at 6:00 p.m. and continuing
Sunday evening at 6:00 p.m.
her

red

Visitation should also be every

letter holiday, with

the exception

of Christmas,

liday visitations should be so structured to insure that the
me holidays do not fall with the same parent each year.

In

edition to every other holiday, the plaintiff should have visitation
:ivileges with the minor son of the parties commencing on Christmas
ay at 1:00 p.m. and continuing

through 8:00 p.m. that evening.

n addition to the foregoing, in absence of an agreement of
he parties, the Court determines

that an extended

period of

isitation during the summer with the minor son would be appropriate
is to the plaintiff, and Orders that a period of three weeks
luring the summer when the minor son is out of school is an
appropriate period of time.

ARMSTRONG V. ARMSTRONG

The Court recognizes
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MEMORANDUM DECISION

that the minor

son of the parties

is old enough so that his outside interests, sports activities,
school activities, and activities with peers are

important,

and. should be considered carefully by the plaintiff in exercising
his visitation.

The minor

son should be consulted

regarding

visitation, and it is the Court's intention that the plaintiff
should be sensitive to the needs and obligations of the miner
son in exercising the plaintiff's right of visitation,
3.

RESIDENCE
The parties have acquired a home during the course of the

marriage in Salt Lake County.
child

Inasmuch as there is a minor

at home with the defendant, and the oldest child of the

parties still resides at home while attending high school, even
though she has reached

her majority,

the defendant should be

awarded the residence, subject to the ongoing mortgage thereon,
and subject

to a lien in favor of the plaintiff against the

home representing his share of the equity as set forth in the
following paragraph.

The equity of the plaintiff in the home

shall be due and payable six months from the occurrence of any
of the following

events:

(1) Defendant remarries or an adult

male not a blood relative resides in the home; (2) the defendant
sells the residence;

(3) the youngest child reaches age 18 or

completes high school, whichever is later.

<A<U>

rRONG V* ARMSTRONG

MEMORANDUM DECISION

PAGE SIX

Both sides have submitted

expert

testimony with

regard

the fair market value of the real properties held by the
:ies, including the residence which
agraph.

is the subject of this

The evaluations of the experts presented by both

ties vary by approximately $25,000.00. Considering the background
experience of the experts, their candor and understanding
the accuracy of their evaluations, and taking
>airs that are required

into account

on the home, the Court

determines

it the appraisal offered by the defendant in the total amount
$126,000.00 as the fair market value of the house is the
:e reliable evaluation.

The mortgage on the residence is

the approximate amount of $29,600.00, leaving an equity* available
r distribution of approximately $96,400.00.

Based upon the

ngth of the marriage and the size of the equity, together
th the property distributions

set forth elsewhere

in this

cision, the Court determines that a fair and reasonable distrittion of the equity would be to allot and assign fifty percent
: the equity in the home to each party.

Accordingly, the lien

: the plaintiff against the residence shall be in the sum of
48,200.00.

The equity will be payable as set forth in the

receding paragraph, and

if the defendant

sells the home to

atisfy the plaintiff's lien, one-half of the fair and reasonable
xpenses in selling the home, including real estate
ill be charged against the plaintiffs equity.

commission

The lien will

<J.+ 7

ARMSTRONG V. ARMSTRONG
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bear no interest until the expiration of six months beyond

the

happening of the three events requiring the payment of plaintiff's
equity.

If the equity is not paid when due, it will bear interest

at the maximum

legal rate.

It is the intention of the Court

that the defendant hold title to the house, subject to a lien,
and accordingly

the necessary documents transferring title to

the defendant from the plaintiff and the creation of a written
lien

in the amount of $48,200.00 should be accomplished by the

parties forthwith.
4.

DUPLEX
As with

the residence, both parties submitted

evidence

through their respective experts regarding the fair market value
of the duplex

income property.

The Court

is of the opinion

considering the plaintiff's high estimate of fair market value,
and

the defendant's estimate of low fair market value, that

the two should be compromised, and that the fair market
is $115,500.00.

value

The evidence shows that there is an outstanding

mortgage of approximately $7,000.00 on the premises, which would
leave an equity available for distribution of $108,500.00.
The Court notes that in 1972 the defendant's mother
$18,250.00 to the plaintiff
interest in the duplex.

paid

and defendant purportedly for an

There was no evidence of the debt other

than a note which purports to bear interest at the rate of 10%
per annum.

The evidence is undisputed that the $18,250.00 was
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brings the amount due under the note to $40,150.00.
is rightfully

$40,150.00

the interests of the defendant and her sister,

and should be subtracted

from

the total equity available

for

distribution of $108,500.00, leaving a balance of $68,350.00.
The Court is of the opinion

that a fair distribution of

the equity between the plaintiff and the defendant, taking all
matters into consideration as required

under the decisions of

the Utah Supreme Court and the statutes of this state, together
with the nature and division of properties and assets set forth
elsewhere

in this Memorandum Decision, that fifty percent of

the net available proceeds of the equity

in the duplex

should

be awarded to both the plaintiff and the defendant, for a total
of $34,175.00 to each.

The Court

is not taking

into

account

the interest that the defendant may have in the $40,150.00 based
upon the promissory note.
The Court determines that the duplex should be sold, from
the net proceeds, $40,150.00 shall be distributed to the defendant
and her sister
that

for distribution

among

them as they see fit,

the outstanding mortgage of approximately

$7,000.00 be

paid, and that the remaining $68,350.00, more or less depending
on the actual sale price of the duplex, be divided equally between
the plaintiff and the defendant.

Each party should bear one-half

of the costs of sale, including

reasonable real estate fees.

Each party will bear their respective tax liability with regard
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potential of substantial deficiencies being assessed against
the plaintiff and/or his corporation if the property is foreclosed.
The majority of the project was developed

while the parties

were separated, and as the defendant did not invest her funds,
together with the fact the project was not a marital endeavor,
equity

requires this Court to assess the liability of the loss

of the project against the plaintiff

if it cannot be salvaged.

Likewise, any income, profits or monies that might be received
in connection with the project are awarded to the plaintiff.
Accordingly, the Valley Terraces Project in Ogden, Utah,
together with any interest

in any condominiums or units now

held by the corporation or the plaintiff in his individual capacity
are awarded to the plaintiff subject to a*ny liabilities on the
project, including tax consequences if any, and that the plaintiff
shall hold the defendant harmless

from any liability on that

project that she may have.
Evidence was produced

and

the plaintiff

claims that the

proceeds from the sale of one of the units has been assigned
to an irrevocable trust plaintiff

set up by himself for the

benefit of the parties' children.

A trust document

prepared

according

to the plaintiff's

produced at the time of trial.

has been

testimony, but was not

At present the evidence

shows

that a sum is received monthly with regard to the sale of the
aforementioned

condominium

unit, and

that the plaintiff

has

^r^

Th

*' i>

.»M=,TRf)N.G

PAGE TWELVE

p l a c e d t h o s e funds in r r ' j r t

A b a l l o o n payment

~ r i „,-1
i

has

insufficitn

c "i I ' s s m n
,1'r-Kl,
to

oi

he

is

tr

evidence

uy

whether

received
iii'nis

,uming

J
use

ot

not

*

if

erewith.

are

.I . " i

leqitimate

»•

the

'

not

in

the
H

trust

i '

i

of

r*Tnni tteci

<u a

i

other

the t i u s t ,

« Held

' •

in t r u s t

to

,j

^r

lust,

i

,,- , >

rne

HIP p l a i n t i f f
>

obligations
be

in

connection

terpj VPJ

t h e n uf c o u r s e

as

li* *•

received

. ii1

attempting

* y(»»j

my

beinq

. L * .i

be i M I e» *-I O V

IUCILL»

', he

Lm* a d a a n ,

"'iirrentiy

currently

his

* i n.i i-1 y

'Old'

HI* awarded

iTif i s f y

property

j"j|fci

uL

i IJ

Januac1

about

OH

benefit

ir- '
If

o u i d '.."JI11!

January
that

and

: i: a i.( e b i1

e

,»r,

whvLho

stifvfu

; his

r

MEMORANDUM. D E C I S I O N

thos•;'

i n d i c a t e d by Hie

a r, e
iumls

trust.

PERSONAL PROPERTY, HOUSEHOLD E'UKNITURE ANU FURNISHINGS
Each n a r t y

awarded

id personcil pus^--

nn

id f u r n i s h i n g s

.

^fendant

receive

ni

hm

1 s re

p o s s e s s ui'i

his

their

respective

I MM i i M m t iff
possession
the

Willi "'I li

is to r e c e i v e the
oil:1 poo s e n t

a*

furniture
" « r p p t ion

personal

and
of

furniture

iiine

furnishings
the

cluthi» |

The

presencly

plaintifffs

hand

00Is

whi ch were g 1 ven t u li 1 in LJy li 1 ',J l, a tlie ,r w! 11 Mt 1 I o, Jo f e r o i a n t

b^M

return

',

to t h e p l a i n t i f f

forthwith.

DEBTS
Plaintiff

larmless

i s o r d e r e d t o assume and pay an J hu(u i.iiw oWoo'<J'* «

m t h e d e b t s and o b l i g a t i o n s

as

listed

on E x h i b i t

P-v,

. -

^

ARMSTRONG V. ARMSTRONG

PAGE THIRTEEN

MEMORANDUM DECISION

with the exception as to those liabilities that have been otherwise
provided for in this opinion.
8.

VEHICLES
The plaintiff

is awarded

debt outstanding thereon.

the Chrysler automobile and the

While the Court recognizes that

the

defendant will require transportation as the Chrysler automobile
does not function at the present

time and the cost to repair

the same is substantial in relation to its fair market value,
particularly
that

taking

into account

the outstanding

obligation

the Chrysler automobile secures, the defendant will have

to purchase substitute
property division.

transportation

The plaintiff

with her share of the

is awarded

the motorcycle,

subject to any liability thereon.
9.

ACCOUNTS
The monies representing the federal 1982 income tax refund,

less interest, are currently being held

in an account in Idaho

by the plaintiff in the approximate sum of $10,000.00.

Plaintiff

acknowledges that the fund is $1,500.00 short, due to his withdrawal
of interest and funds through various transfers since the federal
1982 income tax refund was received.
approximately
attorney.

The state tax return of

$3,400.00 was being held by plaintiff's prior

There is some evidence

that

the state tax

returns

being held in trust may have been used to pay plaintiff's attorney's
fees.

If so, such a distribution of the state income tax refund

^try
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CHILD SUPPORT AND ALIMONY
The evidence shows that the plaintiff is currently unable

to work and is receiving disability at a rate which has been
and will be in the future $2,000.00 per month.

In addition

to the disability income received by the plaintiff, the plaintiff
is currently receiving
amount of $575.00.
payment

rental on condominium unit #7 in the

The plaintiff receives as an interim interest

on unit #4 the condominium

sold which has allegedly

been placed in trust for the children

the amount of $524.00.

From the duplex the plaintiff currently receives a net disposable
income of $450.00 for a total of $3,449.00.
The defendant is unemployed and has not been employed during
the course of the marriage while raising

the parties chilren,

her primary responsibility being running the household and raising
the children of the parties.

The defendant has during the period

of separation, however, recertified herself as a school teacher
and has the ability to assist

in her support.

The evidence

the Court received from the defendant during the course of the
trial suggest the defendant's efforts at employment
that her attempts and

indicate

intentions are less than satisfactory.

The defendant if she is to continue to live in the manner that
she has been accustomed

even during

the period of separation

between the parties will have to actively seek and obtain employment
in the field in which she is qualified.
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the present ability of the parties to generate income.
plaintiff's

income decrease

Should

in the future, the Court will of

course entertain an appropriate Motion

for modification

upon

a showing of change of circumstances.
In reaching the foregoing figures, the Court not only takes
into account

the factors set forth above, but notes that the

plaintiff has paid ongoing temporary

support

in the amount of

$1,600,00 for a lengthy period of time, and in addition to that
has spent substantial sums each month on the two minor children,
all evidencing

his ability to meet the obligation even though

he is not actively employed and is disabled.
12.
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of this action; and the Court being advised in the premises rendere
its Memorandum Decision and in accordance therewith, now makes
the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Plaintiff, at the time of the commencement of this

action had moved his place of residence to Weber County, State
of Utah.

Defendant, at the time of the commencement of the action

was a resident of Salt Lake County, State of Utah and had been
for more than three (3) months prior thereto. The Court finds
that it has jurisdiction over the parties in that the requirements
of residency have been established.
2.

Plaintiff and Defendant were married on November 20,

19 59 at Salt Lake City, Utah.
3.

The Court finds that the Plaintiff on his Complaint

has established sufficient grounds for granting a divorce in his
favor against the Defendant on the basis of mental cruelty in
that the Defendant has, through her words and actions, treated the
Plaintiff cruelly, causing him great mental distress and suffering.
The Court finds that the Defendant, on her Counterclaim, has
established sufficient grounds for granting a divorce in her favor
against the Plaintiff on the basis of mental cruelty in that the
Plaintiff has, through his words and actions, treated Defendant
cruelly, causing her great mental distress and suffering.
The Court determines that good causes exists for waiving
the interlocutory period in that this matter has been pending for
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other red letter holiday, with the exception of Christmas. Holiday
visitation should be so structured to insure that the same holidays
do not fall with the same parent each year.

In addition to every

other holiday, the Plaintiff should have visitation privileges
with the minor son of the parties commencing on Christmas Day at
1:00 P.M. and continuing through 8:00 P.M. that evening.

In additi*

in absence of an agreement of the parties, the Court determines
that an extended period of visitation during the summer with the
minor son would be appropriate as to the Plaintiff and orders that
a period of three (3) weeks during the summer when the minor son
is out of school is an appropriate period of time.
The Court recognizes that the minor son of the parties is
old enough so that his outside interests, sports activities,
school activities and activities with peers are important, and
should be considered carefully by the Plaintiff in exercising his
visitation.

The minor son should be consulted regarding visitation,

and it is the Court's intention that the Plaintiff should be sensiti
to the needs and obligations of the minor son in exercising the
Plaintiff's right of visitation.
6.

During the marriage relationship the parties acquired

an ownership interest in a home and residence located at 8291
Etienne Way, Sandy, Utah.

Inasmuch as there is a minor child at

home with the Defendant, and the oldest child of the parties still
resides at home while attending high school even though she has
reached her majority, the Defendant should be awarded the residence
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ject to the ongoing mortgage thereon, and subject to a lien
favor of the Plaintiff against the home representing his share
the equity as set forth hereinbelow.

The equity of the Plaintiff

the home shall be due and payable six (6) months from the
urrence of any of the following events: (1) Defendant remarries
an adult male, not a blood relative, resides in the home; (2) the
fendant sells the residence; (3) the youngest child reaches age
jhteen (18) or completes high school, which ever is later.
7.

The Court finds and determines from the evidence presented

at the home and residence located at 8291 Etienne Way, Sandy,
ah, has a fair market value of $126,000.00. The mortgage balance
t the residence is in the amount of $29,694.61, leaving an equity
mailable for distribution of $96,305.39. Based on the length of
le marriage and the size of the equity, together with the property
istribution set forth elsewhere in this decision, the Court
etermines that a fair and reasonable distribution of the equity
ould be to allot and assign fifty (50%) percent of the equity in
.he home to each party.

Accordingly, the lien of the Plaintiff

Lgainst the residence shall be in the sum of $48,152.69, which
equity will be payable as set forth in the preceding paragraph.

If

the Defendant sells the home to satisfy the Plaintiff's lien, one-half
(1/2) of the fair and reasonable expenses in selling the home,
including real estate commission, will be charged against the Plaintiff's
equity.

The lien of Plaintiff will bear no interest until the expiration

of six (6) months beyond the happening of the three (3) events

requiring the payment of Plaintiff*s equity.

If the equity is

not paid when due, it will bear interest at the maximum legal rate
It. is the intention of the Court that the Defendant hold title
to the house, subject to a lien, and accordingly, the necessary
documents transferring title to the Defendant from the Plaintiff
and the creation of a written lien in the amount of $48,152.69
should be accomplished by the parties forthwith.
8.

During the marriage relationship, the parties acquired

an ownership interest in real property consisting of a duplex
located at 1773-1775 Hubbard Avenue, Salt Lake City, Utah. Both
parties submitted evidence regarding the fair market value of the
duplex income property.

The Court finds, from the evidence submitt

that the fair market value of the duplex is $115,500.00. The
evidence shows that there is an outstanding mortgage of approximate
$7,000.00 on the premises, which should leave an equity available
for distribution of $108,500.00.
From the evidence, the Court notes that in 1972 the Defendant's mother paid $18,250.00 to the Plaintiff and Defendant
purportedly for an interest in the duplex.

There was no evidence

of the debt other than a note which purports to bear interest at
the rate of ten (10%) percent per annum.

The evidence is undispute<

that the $18,250.00 was not repaid pursuant to the note or otherwise
prior to the death of Defendant's mother.

The evidence is also

undisputed that there were no documents transferring any interest
in the property to the Defendants mother prior to her death, with
the exception that the note prepared by the Plaintiff suggests
-6-

lat it create a living trust for one-half (1/2) of the duplex
i question.

The evidence also supports the proposition that all

arties have treated -the $18,250.00 loan as payment for interest
n one-half (1/2) of the duplex assigned to the Defendant's mother,
nasmuch as the Defendant's mother had died and her estate has
ot been probated, and the evidence shows that the only two (2)
eirs of Defendant's mother are the Defendant and a sister, an
ffset or allocation should be made for the $18,250.00 note now
wned by the Defendant and her sister prior to distributing any
:quity between the Plaintiff and Defendant.

The Court is not

;atisfied that there is sufficient evidence to establish that
.ctual true and correct title was transferred to the Defendant's
lother, and certainly no probate was commenced to create title
„n the estate of Defendant's mother that could pass to the Defendant
ind her sister as heirs of Mrs. Wells.

The Court has calculated

:he note of $18,250.00 at ten (10%) percent simple interest for the
fears 1973 through 1984, not compounding the interest accumulated
luring that period of time there is a total interest due of
521,900.00.

That added to the original note of $18,250.00 brings

the amount due under the note to $4 0,150.00.

$4 0,150.00 is rightfully

the interest of Defendant and her sister, and should be subtracted
from the total equity available for distribution of the $108,500.00,
leaving a balance of $68,350.00.
The Court is of the opinion that a fair distribution of
the equity between the Plaintiff and the Defendant that fifty (50%)

?9 3

percent of the net available proceeds of the equity in the duplex
should be awarded to both the Plaintiff and Defendant, for a
total of $34,175.00 to each.

The Court is not taking into account

the interest that the Defendant may have in the $4 0,150.00 based
upon the promissory note.
The Court determines that the duplex should be sold, from
the net proceeds, $4 0,150.00 shall be distributed to the Defendant
and her sister for distribution among them as they see fit, that
the outstanding mortgage of approximately $7,000.00 be paid, and
the remaining proceeds from the sale of the duplex be divided
equally between Plaintiff and Defendant.

Each party should bear

one-half (1/2) of the cost of sale, including reasonable real estat
fees.

Each party will bear the respective tax liability with regar

to the sale of the properties and the amounts received.

The

parties should be ordered to cooperate in the sale of the duplex
and until such time as the sale occurs, the Plaintiff shall continu
to operate the duplex, shall be responsible for its obligations
and maintenance, and may collect and dispose of the net rents as
the Plaintiff sees fit, insuring that the property is properly
maintained and cared for, and to assist the Plaintiff in paying the
obligations of alimony and support set forth in this decision.
9.

During the marriage relationship, the Plaintiff acquired

a 100% ownership interest in a condominium project located in Ogden
Weber County, Utah, under the name Valley Terraces.

The evidence

supports the finding that the Valley Terraces project was principal
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i project of the Plaintiff.

Defendant has not participated in

i venture financially, except when her inheritance was used,
:hout her knowledge and consent, to secure a portion of the loan
that project. When Defendant became aware that her inheritance
I been pledged, she took the appropriate steps to withdraw her
nds, and other security was submitted.

While this project has

t been successful financially, it does produce income to the
aintiff at the present time, and the Plaintiff resides in one
the units.

It appears that the corporation which owns the

oject, less those units sold, is totally owned by the Plaintiff
d the properties are likely to be lost through foreclosure by
e underlying lending institutions.

It appears that there is a

tential of substantial deficiencies being assessed against the
aintiff and/or his corporation if the property is foreclosed.
Le majority of the project was developed while the parties were
jparated, and as the Defendant did not invest her funds, together
.th the fact that the project was not a marital endeavor, equity
squires this Court to assess the liability of the loss of the
roject against the Plaintiff if it cannot be salvaged. Likewise,
ly income, profits or monies that might be received in connection
Lth the project are awarded to the Plaintiff.
Accordingly, the Valley Terraces project in Ogden, Utah,
Dgether with any interest in any condominiums or units now held by
he corporation or the Plaintiff in his individual capacity are
warded to*the Plaintiff subject to any liabilities on the project,
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including tax consequences, if any, and that the Plaintiff shall
hold the Defendant harmless from any liability on that project
that she may have.
Evidence was produced that the Plaintiff claims that the
proceeds from the sale of one of the units has been assigned by
him to an irrevocable trust set up by Plaintiff for the benefit of
the parties children. According to Plaintiff's testimony, a trust
document has been prepared, but was not produced at the time of
trial.

The evidence shows that a sum is received monthly with

regard to the sale of the aforementioned condominium unit, and that
the Plaintiff has not placed those funds in trust. A baloon payment of approximately $51,000.00 is to be received on or about
January 1, 198 5.

The Court has insufficient evidence upon which to

reach any type of conclusion as to whether or not the trust has
actually been created, or whether or not the funds currently being
received or to be received in January, 198 5 are actually part of
the trust. Any funds that are not currently committed to a trust,
assuming it is a legitimate trust, are awarded to the Plaintiff
for his use and benefit in attempting to salvage the Valley Terraces
project or satisfy his other obligations in connection therewith.
If the funds being received and to be received are the legitimate
property of the trust, then of course those funds should continue
to be held in trust as indicated by the trust.
10.

During the marriage the parties acquired household

furniture, furnishings, appliances and personal property.

Plaintiff

at the time he moved his residence to the Valley Terraces Condominiu

Dject in Ogden, Utah, acquired furniture, furnishings, appliances
i personal property.

The Court finds it is reasonable that

aintiff receive the furniture and furnishings, appliances and
rsonal property in his possession at the present time. The
fendant is to receive the furniture, furnishings, appliances
d personal property in her possession with the exception of the
aintiff's hand tools which were given to him by his father,
tich the Defendant shall return to the Plaintiff forthwith.

It

> reasonable that each party be awarded their respective personal
.othing, jewelry, effects and personal possessions.
11.

During the marriage relationship the parties incurred

^bts and obligations.

The Court finds Plaintiff should be

squired to assume and pay and hold Defendant harmless on the
ebts and obligations listed on Plaintiff's Exhibit P-5, with
he exception as to those liabilities that have been otherwise
rovided for in these Findings of Facts, including and not limited
o, American Express, Ogden Clinic, Arthur Frank, Edwin Jensen,
hillips Petroleum, Castleton's, J.C. Penneys, Conoco, Sears and
roebuck, Memorial Medical, Midland Savings, all debts and obligations
.ncurred in connection with Valley Terraces and his separate debts
ind obligations incurred since separation.
12.

During the marriage the parties acquired an ownership

Interest in a 1978 Chrysler LeBaron automobile.

The Court finds

Lt is reasonable that Plaintiff be awarded the 1978 Chrysler autonobile, subject to the outstanding indebtedness owing thereon
tfhich he is to assume and pay and hold Defendant harmless. The
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Court recognizes that the Defendant will require transportation
as the Chrysler automobile does not function at the present time
and the cost to repair the same is substantial in relation to its
fair market value, particularly taking into account the outstanding
obligation that the Chrysler automobile secures.

It will be

necessary for Defendant to purchase substitute transportation with
her share of the property division.

Plaintiff is awarded the 1964

Honda 90 motorcycle, subject to the obligation owing thereon which
he is to assume and pay and hold Defendant harmless.
13.

The parties received Federal and State income tax refui

for the year 1982. The monies representing the Federal 1982 income
tax refund, less interest, are currently being held in an account
in Idaho by the Plaintiff in the approximate sum of $10,000.00.
Plaintiff was under order of the Court to hold these funds pending
disposition by agreement of the parties or Court order.

Plaintiff

acknowledged that the fund is $1,500.00 short due to his withdrawal
of interest and funds through various transfers since the Federal
and State income tax refunds were received.

The State tax refund

of approximately $3,400.00 was being held by Plaintiff's prior
attorney.

The Court finds from the evidence presented that the

State tax refund being held in trust may have been used to pay
Plaintiff's attorney's fees.

If so, such a distribution of the

State income tax refund would appear to be in violation of this
Court's order prohibiting disbursement of those funds without order
of the Court.

The Court declines to take any action with regard
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the issue of contempt at the present time, conserving that
ae for further determination if necessary.

The Court finds,

ing into account, the short fall admitted by the Plaintiff,
apparent loss of $3,400.00 on the State tax refund, $7,500.00
the amount held in the Idaho account should be immediately
d over to the Defendant by Plaintiff as her share of the total
ids that should be available for distribution.
14.

The record shows Plaintiff filed an individual

leral and State tax return for the year 1983. His individual
:urn for 1983 was not received in evidence, nor was it offered,
that he did not have a copy of it with him at trial. The
int 1983 tax return was received in evidence and marked Exhibit
16.

The joint 1983 return was not filed and is not accurate,

e Court has no evidence before it as to what returns, either
ate or Federal, Plaintiff received so as to make a distribution
those funds. Based upon the current state of the evidence,
tere is insufficient evidence upon which this Court can make a
^termination as to the amount of the refunds received by Plaintiff,
lould the parties supplement the record by stipulation with
*gard to the 198 3 State and Federal refunds, the Court will conLder this matter further.
15.

During the months of October and November and one-half

1/2) of December, 1982, the Plaintiff used marital assets, to-wit:
he sale of gold stock, to provide for Court ordered temporary support
nd alimony.

The stock was sold for approximately $4,000.00 and
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provided for the temporary support order of $1,600.00 per month
for the months above indicated.

One-half (1/2) of the amounts

received for the sale of the gold stock belong and should be credite
to Defendant's side of the ledger. Accordingly, Defendant should
be reimbursed $2,000.00 by the Plaintiff for that portion of the
sale of gold stock which represented her share of that interest.
The $2,000.00 that should be reimbursed to the Defendant by the
Plaintiff should be paid forthwith out of the Idaho account.
16.

From the evidence presented, the Court finds Plaintiff

is currently unable to work and is receiving disability compensation
at the rate which has been and will be in the future of $2,000.00
per month.

In addition to the disability income received by

Plaintiff, the Plaintiff is currently receiving rental on condominii
Unit No. 7 in the amount of $575.00 per month.

Plaintiff receives

as interim interest payment on Unit No. 4, the condominium sold
which has already been placed in trust for the children, the amount
of $4 24.00 per month.

From the duplex the Plaintiff currently

receives a net disposable income of $4 50.00 per month for a total
gross income of $3,449.00.
17.

Defendant is unemployed and has not been employed

during the course of the marriage while raising the-parties childre
her primary responsibility being running the household and raising
the children of the parties. Defendant has, during the period of
separation, however, recertified herself as a school teacher and
has the ability to assist in her support.

The evidence the Court

received from the Defendant during the course of the trial suggests
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t Defendant's efforts for employment indicate that her attempts
intentions are less than satisfactory.

The Defendant, if she

to continue to live in the manner that she has been accustomed
even during the period of separation between the parties, will
r

e to actively seek and obtain employment in the field in which

i is qualified.
Based upon the needs of the parties, at the present time,
* ability of Plaintiff to pay, the length of the marriage, the
/le of living enjoyed by the parties during the course of the
rriage and the distribution of the obligations and assets in
is decision, the Court determines that a fair and equitable
lount for child support is $300.00 per month per child.

The

>urt further determines that the obligation to support the
mghter of the parties who has reached age 18 but still attends
Lgh school, should continue up to and including the month of
m e , 1985 when the daughter graduates from high school. Child
apport for the minor son of the parties will of course continue
ntil such time as he reaches age 18 or completes high school,
hich ever is longer, subject to child support ending at an earlier
ime should the minor son be emancipated prior to his 18th birthday.
'he Court further determines, based upon all of the present
'ircumstances, that the Defendant is in need of and the Plaintiff
las the ability to pay alimony in the sum of $1,000.00 per month.
The evidence suggests that in the future Plaintiff's
Income will decrease.

The Court makes this determination on child

support and alimony based upon the present income of the parties,
and the present ability of the parties to generate income, and
-15-

that the Plaintiff has paid ongoing temporary support in the amount
of $1,600.00 for a lengthy period of time, and in addition to that,
has spent substantial sums each month on the two minor children,
all evidencing Plaintiff's ability to meet the obligati n even
though he is not actively employed and is considered disabled.
Should Plaintiff's income decrease in the future, the Court will
entertain an appropriate motion for modification upon a showing
of change of circumstances.
18.

Each side has incurred substantial attorney's fees,

it would be inequitable for the Plaintiff to be required to pay
any sufficient portion of the Defendant's attorney's fees because
he has been ordered to assume substantial debts and obligations,
particularly in view of those obligations in the condominium project
that potentially exist.

Therefore, the Court determines that

equity requires that each side bear their respective attorney's
fees and costs.
19.

Each party, by stipulation, is to maintain the

life insurance that they presently have in effect, and name the
children of the parties as beneficiaries.
20.

The routine medical expenses that may be incurred

for the children upon which the Plaintiff is paying support are
to be paid by the Defendant with the child support payments receivec
from Plaintiff.

Extra ordinary medical expenses, orthodontic

expenses, and matters of like nature shall be borne equally between
the Plaintiff and Defendant.

Should either party become employed
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re medical and dental insurance is available, that party should
ordered to obtain said insurance for the use and benefit of
children for the period of time that the child support is
•licable.
21.

Both parties have agreed that a mutual Restraining

ler should be appropriate inasmuch as there is some evidence
it the parties have made derrogatory comments to the children
jarding the conduct of the other party.

Each party should be

strained from commenting upon the conduct of the other party
the presence of the children.
22.

Plaintiff has two (2) retirement accounts, one with

rst Continental Life and Accident and the other with Farm
reau Insurance, these retirement accounts were acquired and
cumulated during the marriage.

Defendant is no longer employed

th either First Continental Life and Accident or Farm Bureau
surance.

From the evidence presented by Plaintiff, he will

ceive from First Continental Life and Accident Company retirement
mefit at the retirement age of $341.95 per month.

Plaintiff will

jceive, at retirement age, from Farm Bureau Insurance, the sum
: $354.00 per month.

Plaintiff should be awarded one-half (1/2)

: all retirement benefits presently accumulated by Plaintiff during
le marriage relationship.

Further, Plaintiff has indicated that

3 is willing to divide the retirement benefits that he receives
rom Farm Bureau Insurance and First Continental Life and Accident
Dmpany with the Defendant at the time he receives such benefits.

303
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The Court finds that Defendant should be awarded an interest equal
to one-half (1/2) of the retirement benefits of the Plaintiff at
the time they are received by Plaintiff from First Continental Life
and Accident and Farm Bureau Insurance.

Should Plaintiff be

required to bring legal action against Continental Life and Accident
Insurance Company in an effort to obtain his retirement benefits,
and incurs costs and attorney's fees to do so, the expenses are to
be split between the parties.

Plaintiff shall be entitled to

deduct his costs and attorney's fees not reimbursed from the gross
amounts received from Continental Life and Accident Insurance
Company and submit one-half (1/2) of the net amount to the Defendant
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court concludes
as follows:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The Court has jurisdiction of this matter and the

2.

Plaintiff is entitled to be awarded a Decree of Divorce

parties.

from Defendant upon the grounds of mental cruelty, which Decree is
to become final on entry.
3.

Defendant is entitled to be awarded a Decree of Divorce

from the Plaintiff on the grounds of mental cruelty on her Counterclaim which Decree of Divorce is to become final upon entry.
4.

Plaintiff should be ordered to pay to Defendant child

support of $300.00 per month per child.

Plaintiff should pay

child support to Defendant for the daught r of the parties who
has reached age 18 but is still in high school, to and including
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month of June, 1985 when the daughter graduates from high school.
Id support for the minor son of the parties is to continue
il such time as he reaches age 18 or completes high school,
.ch ever is longer, or should the minor child be emancipated
or to his 18th birthday.
5.

Plaintiff should be ordered to pay to the Defendant

alimony, the sum of $1,000.00 per month.
6.

Defendant should be awarded judgment against the

Lintiff for support arrearages under the temporary order of
i Court in the sum of $2,000.00.

Plaintiff should be ordered to

.mburse Defendant this amount forthwith from the funds held by
lintiff in the Idaho account.

Each party should be awarded the

:erest in the real properties and the personal property as
; forth in the Findings of Fact hereinabove, which Findings of
:t are hereby incorporated in these Conclusions of Law.
7.

Each party should be ordered to pay their own attorney's

*s and costs incurred in this action.
8.

Each party should be ordered to execute any and all

:uments necessary to carry out the awards of property as set
rth in the Findings of Facts set forth hereinabove and as incorrated in these Conclusions of Law.
DONE IN OPEN COURT this

/(&

da^ of April, 198 5.

URT:

ATTEST
H. DIXON HHy&DLEY

v

TTtDeputyCtert

/iMOTITY R. HANSON,

DISTRICT JUDGE
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^

E. H. FANKHAUSER
Bar No. 1032
Attorney for Defendant
660 South 200 East, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, Utah 841-1
Telephone: 534-1148

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

DELBERT C. ARMSTRONG,
|

DECREE OF DIVORCE

I

Civil No.

i

Judge Hanson

Plaintiff,
D 82-3694

vs.
DOROTHY ANN ARMSTRONG,
Defendant.

THIS CAUSE came on for trial at a regular term of the
above entitled Court, pursuant to notice, October 11, 1984.
Plaintiff appeared in person and was represented by his attorney,
Robert A. Echard.

Defendant appeared in person and was represented

by her attorney, E. H. FanJchauser. Each of the parties were sworn
and testified, presented witnesses and evidence to the Court,
which evidence was concluded on October 12, 1984. More than ninety
(90) days having lapsed since the commencement of this action;
and the Court having taken the matter under advisement to consider
the evidence, review and consider the exhibits received during
the course of the trial; and the Court being advised in the premises

adered its Memorandum Decision; and the Court, in accordance
srewith having made and entered its Findings of Facts and
delusions of Law; now, therefore,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND ADJUDGED AS FOLLOWS:
1.

Plaintiff, DELBERT C. ARMSTRONG, be and is hereby

arded a Decree of Divorce on the grounds of mental cruelty
om the Defendant, DOROTHY ANN ARMSTRONG, which Decree of Divorce
all become final on entry.
2.

Defendant, DOROTHY ANN ARMSTRONG, be and is hereby

arded a Decree of Divorce from the Plaintiff, DELBERT C. ARMSTRONG,
the grounds of mental cruelty, which Decree of Divorce shall
come final upon entry.
3-

Defendant be and is hereby awarded the care, custody

d control of the minor child of the parties, to-wit: JAMES D.
MSTRONG, age 14, subject to the right of Plaintiff to visit with
e child at reasonable times and places.

Plaintiff shall have

e right to visit with the minor child as follows:
(a)

Every other weekend commencing Friday evening

at 6:00 P.M. and continuing Sunday evening at 6:00
(b)

P.M.

Every other red letter holiday, with the

exception of Christmas.

Holiday visitation should be

so structured to insure that the same holidays do not
fall with the same parent each year;
(c)

Visitation on Christmas Day at 1:00 P.M. and

continuing through 8:00 P.M. that evening;
(d)

In absence of an agreement of the parties,

three (3) weeks during the summer when the minor son is
-2-

out of school during the summer recess.
Plaintiff, when exercising his visitation with the minor son
should consider carefully the minor son's outside interests, sports
activities, school activities and activities with his peers which
are important.

The minor son should be consulted regarding

visitation and it is the Court's intention that the Plaintiff be
sensitive to the needs and obligations of the minor son in exercisii
Plaintiff's right of visitation.
4.

Defendant be and is hereby awarded as her sole and

separate property, the home and residence of the parties located
at 8291 Etienne Way, Sandy, Utah, subject to the balance of the
mortgage indebtedness owing thereon which Defendant is to assume
and pay and subject to a lien in favor of Plaintiff against
said property in the sum of $48,152.69 representing his share of
the equity in and to said real property.

The equity awarded to

Plaintiff in and to said real property shall be due and payable
six (6) months from the occurrence of any of the following events:
(1) Defendant remarries or an adult male, not a relative, cohabitat^
in the home; (2) the Defendant sells the residence; (3) the youngesi
child reaches age 18 or completes high school, which ever is later.
In the event Defendant sells the home to satisfy the Plaintiff's
lien, one-half (1/2) of the fair and reasonable expenses in selling
the home, including real estate commissions, will be charged againsl
Plaintiff's equity.

The lien of Plaintiff will bear no interest

until the expiration of six (6) months beyond the happening of the
three (3) events requiring the payment of Plaintiff's equity.
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If

e equity is not paid when due, it will bear interest at the
ximum legal rate. Plaintiff is ordered to execute the necessary
cuments transferring title to this real property to the Defendant
om the Plaintiff and the creation of a written lien in the
ount of $48,152.69 forthwith.

The said real property is more

rticularly described as follows:
LOT 23, WILLOW CREEK SUBDIVISION NO. 2
according to the official plat thereof
as recorded in the Salt Lake County
Recorder's Office
5.

The duplex property located at 1773-1775 Hubbard

'enue, Salt Lake City, Utah is to be sold, and from the net proceeds
"ter payment of the outstanding mortgage owing on said property
approximately $7,000.00, $4 0,150.00 plus additional accrued
iterest shall be distributed to the Defendant and her sister for
.stribution among them as they see fit. The remaining proceeds
•om the sale of the duplex is to be divided equally between Plaintiff
Ld Defendant.

Each party should bear one-half (1/2) of the cost

: sale, including reasonable real estate fees.

Each party will

iar their respective tax liability with regard to the sale of the
roperty and the amounts received.

Each party is ordered to

)operate in the sale of the duplex and until such time as the sale
:curs, Plaintiff shall continue to operate the duplex, shall be
^sponsible for its obligations and maintenance, including and
)t limited to, mortgage payments, and may collect and dispose of

-4-

the net rents as Plaintiff sees fit, insuring that the property
is properly maintained and cared for, and to assist Plaintiff in
the payment of the obligations of alimony and support as set
forth in this Decree of Divorce,
6.

Plaintiff be and is hereby awarded free and clear of

the claims of Defendant the Valley Terraces project in Ogden, Utah,
together with any interest in any condominiums or units now held
by the corporation or the Plaintiff in his individual capacity,
subject to any and all liabilities including tax consequences,
if any, and the Plaintiff is ordered to hold the Defendant harmless
from any and all liability on the Valley Terraces project.
7.

From the evidence and testimony produced by Plaintiff

proceeds from the sale of one of the units of the Valley Terraces
project has been assigned by Plaintiff to an irrevocable trust
set up by Plaintiff for the benefit of the parties children.
Plaintiff is to receive a baloon payment of approximately $51,000.0(
in January, 1985. Any funds that are not currently committed to
the trust, assuming it is a legitimate trust, are awarded to the
Plaintiff for his use and benefit in attempting to salvage the
Valley Terraces project or satisfy his other obligations in connect:
therewith.

If the funds being received by Plaintiff and to be

received by Plaintiff are the legitimate property of the trust,
then those funds are ordered to be continued to be held in trust
by Plaintiff as indicated by the Trust and Plaintiff's testimony.

-5-

8.

Plaintiff is awarded the furniture, furnishings,

pliances and personal property in his possession as of the time
trial.
9.

Defendant be and is hereby awarded all of the furniture,

rnishings, appliances and personal property in her possession at
e time of trial with the excpetion of Plaintiff's hand tools
ven to him by his father, which tools Defendant shall return
the Plaintiff forthwith.
10.

Each party is to be awarded their own respective

rsonal clothing, jewelry and effects and personal possessions
ee and clear of all claims of the other.
11.

Plaintiff be and is hereby ordered to assume and pay

d hold Defendant harmless all the debts and obligations listed
i Plaintiff's Exhibit P-5, with the exception as to those liabilities
iat have been otherwise provided for in this Decree of Divorce,
Lcluding and not limited to, American Express, Ogden Clinic,
"thur Frank, Edwin Jensen, Phillips Petroleum, Castleton's,
C. Penneys, Conoco, Sears, Memorial Medical, Midland Savings,
Ld all debts and obligations incurred in connection with Valley
srraces and his separate debts and obligations incurred since
iparation.
12.

Plaintiff be and is hereby awarded the 1978 Chrysler

iBaron automobile, subject to the outstanding indebtedness owing
iereon which he is to.assume and pay and hold Defendant harmless,
irther, Plaintiff is awarded the 1964 Honda 90 motorcycle, subject
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to any obligation owing thereon which he is to assume and pay
and hold Defendant harmless.
13.

Defendant be and is hereby awarded as her share of

the 198 2 Federal and State income tax refunds the sum of $7,500.00.
Plaintiff is ordered to pay $7,500.00 of the amounts held by him
in the Idaho account to Defendant forthwith as Defendant's share
of the total funds from the 198 2 Federal and State tax refunds
available for distribution.
14.

Defendant be and is hereby awarded judgment against

the Defendant for support arrearages for the months of October,
November and one-half (1/2) of December, 1982 in the sum of $2,000.1
together with interest thereon at the judgment rate of twelve (12%)
percent per annum from December, 1982.

Plaintiff is ordered to pay

this judgment to Defendant forthwith from the funds held by Plaintiff in the Idaho account, together with accrued interest.
15.

Plaintiff be and is hereby ordered to pay to the

Defendant as child support the sum of $300.00 per month until the
minor child of the parties reaches age of majority or completes
high school, which ever is longer, subject to child support ending
at an earlier time should the minor son be emancipated prior to
his 18th birthday.

Plaintiff is ordered to pay to the Defendant

child support of $300.00 per month for the daughter of the parties,
JENNIFER ARMSTRONG, who has reached age 18 but is still attending
high school, up to and including the month of June, 198 5, when
the daughter graduates from high school.
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16.

Plaintiff be and is hereby ordered to pay to the

fendant as alimony the sum of $1,000.00 per month.
17.

Each party is ordered to maintain the life insurance

at they presently have in effect and name the children of the
trties as beneficiaries.
18.

Defendant is ordered to assume and pay routine

lical expenses that she may incur on behalf of the children
on which the Plaintiff is paying support to Defendant. All
traordinary medical expenses, orthodontic expenses and matters
like nature shall be borne equally between Plaintiff and Defendant.
the event either party becomes employed where medical and dental
surance is available, that party is ordered to obtain said
surance for the use and benefit of the children for the period
time that child support is applicable.
19.

Defendant be and is hereby awarded one-half (1/2) of

* retirement benefits of Plaintiff accumulated during the marriage
Lationship with First Continental Life and Accident Insurance
npany and Farm Bureau Insurance Company.

Plaintiff is ordered

pay over to Defendant one-half (1/2) of the benefits received
Plaintiff at retirement age from First Continental Life and
:ident Insurance Company and Farm Bureau Insurance Company when
:h benefits are received by Plaintiff.

Should Plaintiff be

luired to bring legal action against Continental Life and Accident
surance Company in an effort to obtain his retirement benefits,
1 incurs costs and attorney's fees to do so, the expenses are
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to be split between the parties.

Plaintiff shall be entitled to

deduct his costs and attorney's fees not reimbursed from the gross
amounts received from Continental Life and Accident Insurance
Company and submit one-half (1/2) of the net amount to the Defendani
20.

Each party is ordered to assume and pay their own

attorney's fees and costs incurred in this action.
21.

Each party be and is hereby mutually restrained from

making any derrogatory comments to the children of the parties
regarding the conduct of the other party, and is further restrained
from commenting upon the conduct of the other party in the presence
of the children.
22.

Each party is ordered to execute any and all documents

of title, deeds or other papers necessary to carry into effect
the awards of real and personal property and the orders of this
Court as set forth in the Memorandum Decision of the Court, the
Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law and this Decree of Divorce
DONE IN OPEN COURT this

day of April, 1985.

BY THE COURT:

TIMOTHY R. HANSON
DISTRICT JUDGE

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I certify a true and correct copy of the foregoing was
.led to Robert A. Echard, Attorney for Plaintiff, 635 25th Street,
len, Utah 84401, in accordance with Rule 2.9 of Rules of Practice,
this

3"

day of April, 1985.

^TLJUCAAI.
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Salt Lake County. Utah

Robert A. Echard
Attorney for Defendant
635 - 25th Street
Ogden, UT 84401
801-621-3317

MAY 2 ! 1985
H. Dugp H*no<ay, Cjptk 3rd Dist Court

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE

COUNTY

STATE OF UTAH

DELBERT C. ARMSTRONG

ORDER ON ORDER TO SHOW
CAUSE

Plaintiff/
vs.
DOROTHY ANN ARMSTRONG,
Civil No.

D 82-3694

Defendant.
The defendants Order to Show Cause came on for hear

before the Honorable Timothy R. Hanson, on the 4th day of Apr
1985, at 3:00 p.m. The Plaintiff was present in Court with
attorney, Ephram H. Fankhauser, and the Defendant was present
court with his attorney, Robert A. Echard.

The Court hav

heard testimony from the parties and being full informed of
premises, now therefore,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AS FOLLOWS:
1.

That the duplex belonging to the party shall be pla

with the real estate agent for sale immediately.

The Plaint

shall provide to the defendant a list of three real estate age
in the Salt Lake area.

The Defendant shall select one of s

real estate agents with whom the property shall be listed.
LAW OFFICE OF

ridley, Echard
&Ward
35 - 25TH STREET
3DEN, UTAH 84401

2.

That the property shall be listed at the value placed

upon in by the Court in its Findings and Facts and Conclusions of
Law.
3.
refusal

That the defendant
and

to match

shall have the first right of

any offer

made

against

the

property;

provided, however, that the defendant must be willing to pay the
same price and comply with the same terms and conditions as any
offer made on the property*
4.

That the real estate listing shall

be for no more

than three months.
5.

That the Plaintiff shall have the right to manage and

collect the rents from the duplex.

From these sums the Plaintiff

shall be required to keep the building in reasonable condition
but shall not be required to repaint or make improvements on the
premises other than is necessary to rent the same.
6.
Exhibit

That the expenses set forth by the Defendant in her
D-l

Defendant

are_ reasonable,

shall

be

and

entitled

to

in

addition

reimburse

to

those

herself

in

approximate sum of $17.05 for repairs made to the duplex.

the
the
That

the balance of moneys on hand at the time of the court hearing
shall be turned over to the Defendant immediately.

In addition,

the Defendant shall turn over to the Plaintiff any and all rents
she has collected for the month of April 1985.
7.

That the Defendant

shall not be entitled

for any

reimbursement for time or travel incurred in managing the duplex.
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8.

That

the Plaintiff

shall be required

to maint

records concerning the rents and expenses on said duplex un
such time as it is sold.
9.

Each party shall assume

fees and court

cost

for

and pay their own attorne

this part

of

the Order

Show C*

hearing.
10.

That a hearing pertaining to t#e modification of

alimony and child support is continued t/o be heard on TuescJ
the 28th of rfay at 2:30 p.m.
DATED thiis

jV

day of

APPROVED AS TO FORM

9

AYTIST

m^M^//^.

t . H.' EKankhauser
Attorney for Defendant

<r

Deputy C l « h

